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ABSTRACT
While it is known that acute and chronic stress can impact cognition, less is known about
the immediate impacts of minor frustrations or positive experiences on subsequent behavior and
cognition in primates. This study used a novel methodology to engineer both a positive and
(slightly) frustrating experience, using the same apparatus, in 15 adult capuchin monkeys.
Subjects were presented with a working memory task (DMTS) for 30 minutes after the
experimental manipulations (or a control). As predicted, the frustrating task prior to testing
resulted in a decrease in performance on the DMTS compared to performance after a positive
experience or the control. Contrary to predictions, a positive experience did not facilitate
performance to higher levels than the control condition. Manipulations also impacted several
behaviors. Although there may be different results in different contexts, these results indicate
that even mild negative experiences impact subsequent behavior and cognition in primates.
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1

INTRODUCTION

An interest in describing and explaining emotions dates back to the early philosophers.
Actual scientific research on emotions however, has had a more recent and staggered history. In
psychology, the scientific study of emotions has had three major stages (Gendron & Barrett,
2009). The first era, marked by prolific scientific study of emotions, is often attributed to
Darwin’s publication of The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872). This lead
to interesting debates in the scientific community over the manifestation of emotion (Cannon,
1927; James, 1884). Following this initial period of excitement and interest, the age of
behaviorism swept in and left little room for the study of emotion (Gendron & Barrett, 2009;
Lazarus, 1998). In the 1960’s, with behaviorism’s decreasing authority in American psychology,
a renewed interest in the study of emotions appeared (Gendron & Barrett, 2009; Lazarus, 1991).
The history of the study of non-human animal (hereafter, animal) emotion follows a
similar pattern. Darwin and James’ discussions of human emotions included comparisons to the
emotional lives of animals, but again interest diminished with the rising power of behaviorism
(de Waal, 2011). Despite the decrease in the authority of behaviorism giving rise to increased
psychological research on human emotions, the study of animal emotions did not follow the
same trend.
There remains reluctance by some to attribute emotional states experienced by humans to
any of our mammalian relatives (Bolhuis & Wynne, 2009). There are however many advocates
in the scientific community for the position that animals do experience emotional lives akin to
humans (de Waal, 2011; Panksepp, 2005). In the last few decades, there has been an increasing
call for research on animal emotions from a functional and evolutionary standpoint to better
understand human emotion (Lench, Darbor, & Berg, 2013; Trimmer, Paul, Mendl, McNamara,
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& Houston, 2013; Weisfeld & Goetz, 2013), as well as for potentially important applications in
neuroscience, psychopharmacology (Mendl, Burman, & Paul, 2010), and animal welfare (Boissy
et al., 2007; Dawkins, 2000; Désiré, Boissy, & Veissier, 2002). De Waal effectively sums up the
conundrum behind our relative lack of studies on animal emotions, asserting that while animal
emotion is deemed of little importance, it is rarely denied existence, leaving us with “the curious
situation that a widely recognized aspect of animal behavior is deliberately ignored or
minimized” (de Waal, 2011).
Aside from leading to a failure to develop a broader understanding of animals, this may
also hinder our ability to understand ourselves. Presumably, as with many other aspects of
human psychology, basic human emotions have evolutionary roots exhibited in related taxa,
particularly non-human primates (hereafter, primates), however little attention has been paid to
this potentially highly illuminating connection, and comparative studies have been limited.
Phylogenetic analyses could help determine whether there are similar interacting psychological
processes in non-human mammalian brains, and further our understanding of the evolution and
function of particular emotions in humans (Weisfeld & Goetz, 2013).
One of the barriers researchers of animal emotion have run into is a definitional one.
Despite the increased interest in the study of emotion seen in recent decades, syntheses of
research across disciplines are few and far between. The fundamental question of how to define
‘emotion’ lies at the heart of this issue. Emotions are something all humans are familiar with, but
when asked, “what is an emotion?,” many struggle to produce an explicit definition. Even when
asking those who are sure of their definition, responses will vary quite drastically. This issue has
not been fully resolved, and often definitions differ between psychologists, philosophers,
neuroscientists, sociologists, and anthropologists (Barrett, 2006a) .
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The matter of establishing definitional clarity across fields as to what constitutes an
emotion is beyond the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, it is important to define what I mean for
the purposes of this study. The relevance of the debate for animal research lies in the factors
included in some definitions of emotion, and their relation to studying emotions in animals.
Oftentimes definitions will include a subjective experience component (Hockenbury &
Hockenbury, 2010), which means that an emotional component necessitates consciousness.
Whether or not non-human animals are conscious in the way we refer to human consciousness is
an unresolved debate (Griffin & Speck, 2004; Mendl & Paul, 2004). Therefore, definitions of
emotion that require consciousness pose a rather difficult hurdle for those who wish to study
animal emotion. There are, however, many who define emotion without a subjective experience
component (Boissy et al., 2007; de Waal, 2011), which is more tractable for empirical study.
Additionally, regardless of whether scientists attribute ‘emotion’ in the human sense to animals’
experiences, it is generally agreed upon that at minimum, animals experience changes in affect
(Dawkins, 2000; Panksepp, 2005, 2011; Paul, Harding, & Mendl, 2005a).
It is then important to differentiate between the terms ‘emotion’ and ‘affect’. For a time
in psychology’s past, and still to some extent today, affect and emotion were used almost
interchangeably (Daniel, Shaw, & Oleson, 1992). In modern psychology there has been an effort
to distinguish between the terms, but as with the challenge of defining emotion, there is not
universal agreement. In general, affect refers to the mental aspect of the internal bodily states
associated with our representations of emotion (Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009; Spruijt, van den
Bos, & Pijlman, 2001). Affect is the psychologically primitive state made up of an arousal level
and hedonic valence (Duncan & Barrett, 2007; Russell, 2003). Affect can be a component of
emotion, but also exists in pure forms alone. A person is constantly experiencing affect, just the
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nature and intensity of it are changing (Ekkekakis, 2013). Unlike emotions, affective states
involve no judgment or assessment, and are not necessarily directed at anything (Russell, 2009).
Affect has been a topic of psychological interest and research since the late 1800’s, dating back
to Wundt and Titchner, who argued that affect is a fundamental “psychological ingredient” that
cannot be further reduced, and that affect combined with other cognitive components is what
creates an emotion (Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009). Therefore, emotion is the fusion of core
affective feeling with conceptual knowledge and experience, integrated mentally to categorize
the emotion (Barrett, 2006b).
For the purpose of the current study, I will typically use the term affect in reference to
any potentially emotional experience in animals. With that being said, the relevant literature
discussed will include studies referring to animal emotions, not just affect, and woven
throughout the paper will be parallels drawn between research on animal ‘affect’ and human
‘emotion’. Further, even animal research that generally refers to affect and not emotions often
specifically utilizes emotional language such as ‘stress’, ‘frustration’ and ‘anxiety’ when
referring to the affective experiences of their subjects (Gluck & Sackett, 1974; Maestripieri,
Schino, Aureli, & Troisi, 1992; Troisi, 2002). The current study will also sometimes refer to a
state of ‘frustration’ in the animal subjects, with the intention that this helps specify the type of
affective state being experienced.
1.1

The Emotion-Cognition Interaction
Despite the fact that the emotion-cognition relationship has long been of interest to

philosophers, in psychology, emotions and cognition have a history of being treated as separate
entities and deemed of differential importance (Gendron & Barrett, 2009; Houwer & Hermans,
2013). Since the 1980’s however, empirical research has started to address questions of the
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interaction between emotions and cognitive processing, such as attention, memory, learning,
judgments and decisions, and it is now well known that emotions/affect and cognition are
complex, interrelated components of psychological processing (Houwer & Hermans, 2013).
Much of the research has focused on how emotional stimuli are treated different cognitively than
neutral stimuli. Numerous studies have demonstrated that emotionally significant stimuli
selectively receive more attention than non-emotional stimuli (Bradley, Mogg, & Lee, 1997;
Compton, 2003; Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001). Further, emotional stimuli are better
remembered than neutral stimuli (Cahill & McGaugh, 1998; Hamann, Ely, Grafton, & Kilts,
1999).
While some impacts of emotions are general and not emotion or even valence specific,
such as the general enhancement of memory for positive or negative emotional stimuli (Hamann
et al., 1999), other cognition-emotion interactions are more specific. Of particular interest to the
current study, the impacts of emotion on working memory are asymmetric, such that positive
emotions can have facilitating effects on some tasks and detrimental effects on others, while the
opposite is true for negative emotions (Bartolic, Basso, Schefft, Glauser, & Titanic-Schefft,
1999). These results have been traced to differences in brain activation patterns when
experiencing emotion.
Neurological research has demonstrated a different lateralization of activation in the
frontal lobe when experiencing positive and negative emotions, such that positive emotions
result in relatively higher levels of left frontal lobe activation, while negative emotions are
associated with right frontal lobe activity (Ahern & Schwartz, 1985; Davidson, Ekman, Saron,
Senulis, & Friesen, 1990). The interpretations one draws from these findings, however, have not
been quite as straightforward. Some claim that brain activation in the area required by a task
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facilitates performance on that task, such that positive emotions (increasing left hemisphere
activation) enhance performance on tasks reliant on left prefrontal cortex (PFC) activation, while
negative emotions (increasing right hemisphere activation) facilitate performance on right PFC
tasks (Gray, 2001; Heller & Nitscke, 1997). This stems from the idea that activation reflects a
readiness to engage in certain tasks, such as those that require similar brain activation (Bartolic et
al., 1999). Alternatively, dual processing models theorize that when two tasks or processes are
utilizing the same brain region, performance on the task may be impaired if there is a depletion
of cognitive resources or cross-talk interference (Kinsbourne & Hicks, 1978; Shackman et al.,
2006).
Working memory poses a particularly good area of study in this regard, because different
types of working memory, while all fairly reliant on PFC activity, differ in brain activation
within different regions of the PFC. Numerous studies have demonstrated that verbal working
memory is left lateralized while spatial working memory is right lateralized (d’Esposito et al.,
1998; Davidson et al., 1990). Other studies have similarly found right lateralization for spatial
working memory and compared it to object working memory tasks that are relatively left
lateralized (Courtney, Petit, Haxby, & Ungerleider, 1998; d’Esposito et al., 1998; Smith et al.,
1995). These findings inspired a series of studies looking at the asymmetric effects of emotion on
cognition between different working memory tasks during positive or negative emotional states.
Bartolic and colleagues’ (1999) study was one of the first to systematically induce
positive and negative affect in participants and examine the effects on two tasks associated with
different frontal lobe activation. Either positive or negative affect was induced in participants
using the Velten Mood Induction Procedure (VMIP) in which subjects listened to, and then read
silently and aloud, self-referent statements about their mood. Participants were then tested on
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either the Controlled Oral Word Association Task (associated with increased relative activation
of the left frontal lobe), or the Ruff Figural Fluency Test (associated with increased activation of
the right frontal lobe), to look at the effects of emotion on verbal and figural fluency,
respectively. The results of the experiment were consistent with their predictions that
emotionally induced brain activation would result in a ‘readiness’ that would facilitate
subsequent tasks asymmetrically reliant on that brain region. Positive affect (left activating)
enhanced verbal fluency (left activating) above figural fluency (right activating), while negative
affect (right activating) coincided with the opposite effects.
In another pioneering study, Gray (2001) designed an experiment to contrast the effects of
emotion on spatial and verbal working memory. An important distinction between Gray’s study
and those that preceded it was their ability to control for motivation and task difficulty by using a
two-back task for both verbal and spatial working memory assessment. In the study, subjects had
positive, negative (referred to in the paper as approach and withdrawal, respectively), and neutral
emotional states induced by watching videos. Subjects were then tested on either a verbal or a
spatial two-back task. In both tasks, a letter (a-f) appeared somewhere on the screen and subjects
had to indicate whether it was the same or different than the item two items ago. For the verbal
task subjects were told to ignore location and indicate whether the letter was the same or not, and
for the spatial task they were told to ignore the letter and indicate whether it was in the same
location on the screen or not. Overall, Gray found that positive emotional states increased
performance on the verbal task while impairing performance on the spatial task, while the
opposite was true of negative emotional states, increasing spatial performance while hindering
verbal. The results also indicated that the effects were significantly stronger for those individuals
who did the most poorly on the tasks (Gray, 2001). The importance of these studies was in
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demonstrating that emotional valence, and not just emotional arousal generally, had selective
effects on cognitive functioning and may be a result of interacting brain activation patterns.
Additionally, both of these studies supported the model predicting that prior activation of a brain
region similarly activated in a subsequent task facilitated performance on that task.
Unfortunately the clear picture these studies painted has since been clouded. Lavric and
colleagues (2003) and Shackman and colleagues (2006) both empirically tested the asymmetric
effects of emotions on verbal and spatial working memory, and found the opposite effects of the
previously discussed studies. Both of these later studies hypothesized that the cognitive demands
of threat-evoked anxiety would deplete resources in the right PFC and impair spatial working
memory (dependent on the right PFC) but not verbal working memory (dependent on the left
PFC), and both of the studies found support for their hypotheses. They additionally both cited
that a flaw of the previous studies (Bartolic et al., 1999 & Gray, 2001) was their lack of an
objective measure of affect, like the inclusion of heart-rate measures or startle responses, as well
as self-report. Shackman suggests that perhaps modest levels of anxiety do in fact produce an
enhancing effect to right PFC tasks, however higher anxiety levels represent an increase in
resource depletion that may lead to the deleterious effects found in these later studies.
This difference in the level of affect may explain both sets of data. If both Gray (2001) and
Bartolic and colleagues’ (1999) manipulations induced only mild negative affect, while the threat
of a shock used in Lavric and colleagues’ (2003) and Shackman and colleagues’ (2006) studies
induced much higher levels of anxiety, then this could explain the disparate results. Indeed,
Shackman and colleagues note that in Gray’s (2001) study, the level of anxiety reported by
participants was half that reported by the later two studies. Regardless of a consensus on how
brain activation is mediating asymmetric effects of emotion on cognition, which remains
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important, the research is clear that there is in fact an interaction between different valence
emotions and subsequent working memory performance.
1.2

Research on Affect in Animals
Affective research with non-human animals had a later start than research with humans,

and has also taken a different trajectory. While human research is also subject to a bias towards
negative emotion, this is the predominant focus in animals (Moberg, 2013; Paul, Harding, &
Mendl, 2005b; Rosen & Donley, 2006). Early emotional research with animals primarily
stemmed from an interest in using animals as models of human emotion, and often exploited the
less rigid ethical standards required for research with non-human animals compared to that with
humans. This led to animals being used as models of pain exposure (Maier, Drugan, & Grau,
1982), drug use (Bodnoff, Suranyi-Cadotte, Quirion, & Meaney, 1989), early maternal
separation (Higley, Hasert, Suomi, & Linnoila, 1991), and social isolation (Matsumoto, Pinna,
Puia, Guidotti, & Costa, 2005), as well as the general effects of acute and chronic stress on
cognition and behavior (Cazakoff, Johnson, & Howland, 2010; Moreira, Almeida, LeiteAlmeida, Sousa, & Costa, 2016). Brain lesion research, used to look at the involvement of
particular brain regions on emotional processing, was also only possible in animals (BlissMoreau, Bauman, & Amaral, 2011; Kalin & Sheltona, 2003).
While animal models of human emotional processing have been influential, the gap in
knowledge on the behavioral, cognitive, and physiological responses to positive affect in nonhuman species is striking. Additionally, by focusing studies of animal affect on scenarios of such
intensity that we cannot test human participants, or modeling animal research on clinical
populations, we are neglecting the acquisition of knowledge on the key types of affective
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processing that we know much about in humans, specifically how normal fluctuations in positive
and negative affect impact animal behavior and cognition in their day to day lives.
Recently though, and in line with the current study, researchers have begun to study
animal affect in a way more comparable to what is seen in the literature on human affect and to
discover the parallels and differences in the psychological processing of animal emotions. The
most immediate challenge with this, however, is measurement, because of the difficulty in
ascertaining what affective state is being experienced and when. The disproportionate
representation of research on negative affect in animals continues in this area, at least in part due
to the relative ease of observing and measuring negative affect as compared to positive affect
(Boissy et al., 2007).
In humans, the most common measure of emotion is self-report. While self-report is
obviously not possible when studying a non-human animal species, instead of being a
shortcoming, it can be an opportunity to develop reliable objective measures of affect so that we
can determine what an organism is feeling instead of what they say they are feeling. Indeed, in
humans, self-report measures of emotions are not always reliable, particularly when reflecting on
past emotional states as opposed to current states (Robinson & Clore, 2002). Mauss and
Robinson (2009) purport that experiential, physiological and behavioral measures of emotion
should not be treated interchangeably, but used in concert with one another for the most
comprehensive understanding of emotional experiences.
As experiential measures are impossible with animals, physiological and behavioral
measures have been the most utilized methodologies in determining affect in animals. Some
commonly used physiological measures of animal affect are heart rate, skin conductance and
temperature, blood pressure, and measures of hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) function
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(Aureli, Preston, & de Waal, 1999; Blanchard et al., 1998; Elder & Menzel, 2001; Paul et al.,
2005b; Süer, Dolu, Özesmi, Şahin, & Ülgen, 1998). These are not, however, the most ideal
measures of affect alone, as many of them are invasive and require stress-inducing restraint of
the animal, or have low temporal accuracy. Sampling methods that themselves cause stress and
anxiety in the subjects cannot be used, and even those that do not do so, such as implanted heart
monitors, may require an invasive surgery and/or expensive equipment to set up. Additionally,
these physiological measures have a tendency to measure negative affect more reliably than
positive affect, and they do not provide a high level of specificity for the affect being
experienced, typically providing more information on arousal than valence. In general, these
measures work best in conjunction with other measures, or to provide a very general measure of
affective change.
As a result, researchers have turned to behavioral measures, which avoid many of these
problems. Behavioral measures used to look at affect in animals include vocal expressions (rats;
Knutson, Burgdorf, & Panksepp, 2002; baboons; Rendall, 2003; cattle; Watts & Stookey, 2000)
approach/withdrawal behavior (rhesus macaques; Humphrey & Keeble, 1974; rats; Montgomery
& Monkman, 1955) and spontaneous behaviors such as play (Fraser & Duncan, 1998; Paul et al.,
2005b). Animals’ startle responses have been a less widely used measure of affective state, but
have promise as a simple indicator of affective valence, with negative affect increasing startle
responses and positive affect attenuating them (Cook, Davis, Hawk, Spence, & Gautier, 1992;
Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1990; Lang, Davis, & Öhman, 2000). Additionally, overt behaviors
of organisms can often be used to measure affective state, and may be both the most easily
recorded and reliable behavioral measure. In primates as well as other species, displacement
behaviors such as scratching and other self-directed behaviors have been widely used as an
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indicator of negative affect (Maestripieri et al., 1992; Troisi, 2002), and stereotypic, repetitive
behaviors have also been implicated as a sign of psychological distress (Garner, 2005; Garner,
Meehan, & Mench, 2003; Novak, Bailoo, Melotti, Rommen, & Würbel, 2015; Pomerantz,
Terkel, Suomi, & Paukner, 2012). Unfortunately, none of these behaviors are able to measure
both negative and positive affect.
Recently, cognitive outputs, such as attention, memory, and judgment biases, have been
proposed as a potential measure of affective states in animals (Paul et al., 2005). The idea behind
this is that if different affective states are demonstrated to have predictable changes in cognitive
outputs, then if you observe these changes in cognitive output, you may be able to trace the
change back to the affective state being experienced. Attention biases in humans demonstrate
that people experiencing negative affective states, particularly anxiety, bias their attention toward
threatening stimuli more than when experiencing positive affect (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin,
Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007; Bradley et al., 1997). Similarly, memory bias
studies with both humans and non-human animals have demonstrated that emotional states can
impact memory retention and retrieval, such that negative affect can improve memory. This
latter effect appears somewhat non-specific and more work has to be done before memory biases
can be used as an effective tool for affect measurement in animals (Cahill & McGaugh, 1998;
Kensinger & Schacter, 2008).
Judgment biases, such as interpretations of ambiguity, while arguably the most complex
of the three cognitive biases mentioned, may also be the most promising area for animal affect
research (Paul et al., 2005) and have already been utilized across a range of species (rats:
Anderson, Munafò, & Robinson, 2012; Brydges, Leach, Nicol, Wright, & Bateson, 2011;
Harding, Paul, & Mendl, 2004; pigs: Douglas, Bateson, Walsh, Bédué, & Edwards, 2012; dogs:
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Michael Mendl, Brooks, et al., 2010; sheep: Doyle et al., 2010; rhesus macaques: Bethell et al.,
2012; capuchin monkeys: Pomerantz et al., 2012; Schino et al., 2016). Generally speaking,
judgment biases manifest with positive affect resulting in ‘optimistic’ interpretations of
ambiguity, and negative affect resulting in ‘pessimistic’ interpretations. Research with humans
demonstrates that subjects in positive moods assign higher probabilities to positive future
outcomes than negative future outcomes, while the opposite is true for subjects experiencing
negative affect (Hirsch & Mathews, 1997; Nygren, Isen, Taylor, & Dulin, 1996; Wright &
Bower, 1992).
The initial methodology put forth by Harding, Paul, and Mendl (2004) utilized a go/no-go
paradigm where rats were trained to press a lever after hearing a specific tone to receive a food
reward, and refrain from pressing the lever after hearing a different tone in order to avoid a
negative event. After this training, subjects were divided into two groups living in either
‘predictable housing’ or ‘unpredictable housing’. Unpredictable housing had been previously
established as stress inducing for the rats. All subjects were then presented with an ambiguous
tone, intermediate between the tones associated with positive and negative outcomes, and
subsequent behavior was measured. Rats in the unpredictable housing condition were slower to
respond, and significantly less likely to press the lever than were rats in the predictable housing
condition, demonstrating that they tended to interpret the ambiguous stimuli as negative
(expecting a shock) more often than the rats who lived in less stressful housing environments.
Variations of this technique have been used, and regardless of methodology, these studies are
finding significant judgment biases in the animal species tested, such that negative affective
states correlate with a negative interpretation of ambiguous stimuli, while positive affective
states correlate with a positive interpretation of ambiguity.
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The issue with translating this measure to primates is that the original methodology put
forth utilized positive and negative outcomes for the different stimuli. This poses an ethical
dilemma for many species, since shocks or changes in housing are not always ethical or
appropriate. To account for this, researchers have adapted the paradigm so that the only
‘negative’ outcome that subjects experience is a lack of reward (Bethell et al., 2012; Pomerantz
et al., 2012; Schino et al., 2016). While this may solve the ethical dilemma, lack of reward is not
especially salient as a negative outcome, particularly for subjects that are used to experimental
tests in which they are unrewarded on some trials (i.e., following incorrect responses).
Despite this potential issue, recent studies with capuchins have successfully utilized the
judgment bias measure to look at how normal positive social interactions such as grooming, as
well as more long-term states such as rank or the expression of stereotypic behaviors, may be
impacting affect (Pomerantz et al., 2012; Schino et al., 2016). In both of these studies, subjects
interpreted an ambiguous length stimulus after learning that certain longer or shorter length
stimuli corresponded to different value foods in specific locations. Subjects who looked in the
location of the higher value reward in response to the ambiguous stimulus were deemed to be
making an ‘optimistic’ judgment, while selection of the lower value reward location was marked
a ‘pessimistic’ judgment.
The first study found that subjects who exhibited high levels of stereotypic behavior
demonstrated negative judgment biases compared to monkeys who performed less stereotypic
behavior, but the effect was only significant for stereotypic head-twirling and not pacing
behavior (Pomerantz et al., 2012). The other study found that rank and high overall levels of
received grooming correlated with positive judgments in the task, but there were no immediate
effects of recently received grooming on the judgment bias (Schino et al., 2016). These results
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indicate that judgment biases may be most useful when looking at more long-term states than
short-term, within-individual changes in affect, although it also could indicate that grooming
does not impact subsequent affect.
While the purpose of these studies was to demonstrate that certain behaviors impacted the
affective states of the monkeys, using judgment biases as merely a measure of affect, they also
demonstrate that affective states affect cognition. While this was not a driving intention behind
the studies themselves, the entire concept of this measurement relies upon the fact that different
affective states are impacting cognition in specific ways. As the judgment bias is found in
multiple species of animals as well as humans, this provides evidence that animal cognition is
impacted by emotional processing in similar ways to humans (Brydges et al., 2011; Matheson,
Asher, & Bateson, 2008; Michael Mendl, Burman, Parker, & Paul, 2009; Rygula, Pluta, &
Popik, 2012).
Finally, research has now further demonstrated that animals, and specifically non-human
primates, have similar psychological processing systems for emotions and affect as that of
humans. Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) experience physiological arousal in response to
emotionally charged videos, and are able to match conspecific emotional facial expressions to
the valence of a video scene (Parr, 2001). Animals also apparently process emotional stimuli
similarly to humans. Chimpanzees experience delayed reaction times in response to negative
images in comparison to neutral stimuli in an emotional Stroop task, akin to the responses of
humans (Allritz, Call, & Borkenau, 2015). Additionally, Blanchette et al. (2016) recently
demonstrated that baboons (Papio papio) respond less accurately and with a greater response
time to negative stimuli in comparison to neutral. This study was one of the first to demonstrate
that the negative stimuli did not need to be visually present for the effect to occur, but still
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manifests when the stimulus is only mentally represented. These studies further demonstrate that
the organization of emotional processing within primate brains may be similar to that in humans.
As in the human literature, animal researchers are interested in not just how task-related
emotional stimuli can interfere with cognitive processing and attention, but how task-irrelevant
affective states may be affecting behavior and cognition, and vice versa. We know that behavior
can impact the affective states of animals (i.e., judgment biases), but how do those affective
states impact subsequent behavior and cognition? This is the focus of my current work.
Additionally, I will try to address a remaining issue facing animal researchers, the fact that the
classification of positive affect remains elusive. While ‘optimistic’ judgment biases may allow
for the identification of positive affect, there is uncertainly as to whether this bias would be
effective in measuring small, short-term changes in affect. Specifically, my goal is to identify an
observable behavioral indicator of positive affect.
1.3

Purpose of the Study
The primary purpose of the current study was to explore the inter-relationship between

affect and cognition in a primate model. I wanted to make the research as comparable as possible
to the human literature, so that I could consider the similarities between human and non-human
animal psychological processing. With comparative research, however, it can be difficult to draw
any definitive conclusions when procedures being compared are vastly different (Brosnan,
Beran, Parrish, Price, & Wilson, 2013). Due to the prevalence of language-based inductions and
measures in human emotion research, it is often impossible to use the exact same methodology
with animals, and therefore keeping at least the nature of the experiments as similar as possible is
vital. Previous research on animal affect has primarily focused on the effects of intense negative
affect as the result of extreme stimuli (such as shocks), and while this is informative, in most
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human studies the affect inducer is relatively mild (and arguably more similar to naturally
occurring context). Relatively little research has focused on animal affect as it plays out in a
healthy organism’s typical life (with a few notable exceptions described above), and past
research has rarely generated affective states akin to those created within contexts in the
subjects’ natural lives.
I therefore attempted to present the capuchins with a manipulation reflecting their natural
behavior, which I expected to induce both positive and negative affect in different contexts.
Capuchin monkeys are extractive foragers (Fragaszy, Visalberghi, & Fedigan, 2004), meaning
they routinely extricate food from difficult to obtain sources, such as inside hard-shelled nuts.
This study’s affect manipulation took advantage of this, artificially creating a negative
experience where food was unobtainable from a previously reliable source, and generated a
positive experience using the same task but allowing it to result in consistent high value reward
acquisition.
Affect manipulation was immediately followed by a delayed match-to-sample task, to
measure working memory performance in the monkeys. In line with the human literature on the
effects of emotions and affective states on working memory, as well as some primate studies, I
hypothesized there would be a decrease in cognitive performance after a negative experience and
an enhancing effect of a positive experience (Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999; Oei, Everaerd,
Elzinga, van Well, & Bermond, 2006; Schoofs, Preuss, & Wolf, 2008).
A second goal of the current study was to inform the sparse literature on the effects of
positive affect in animals. My primary focus was to find behavioral indicators of positive affect,
of which there are none in the current literature. In this study, I collected data on all behaviors
exhibited by the subjects, not just behaviors known to be important in animal affective
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experience drawn from the literature, in the hopes of discovering a behavioral marker of positive
affect. I did not have any direct predictions for what behaviors might increase after a positive
experience, which presumably led to positive affect, and thus hoped to find behavioral measures
that correlated with the condition. Consistent with the literature, I predicted that rates of
displacement behaviors, such as scratching, self-touching and urine washing, as well as
stereotypic behaviors, would increase after subjects had a negative experience that presumably
led to negative affect (Garner, 2005; Maestripieri et al., 1992; Troisi, 2002).
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2
2.1

METHODS

Subjects
Subjects used in the current study were 15 adult (7 male) tufted capuchin monkeys

(Cebus apella), housed at Georgia State University’s Language Research Center. Subjects were
all socially housed in three separate multi-male, multi-female social groups composed of five, six
and 10 individuals (Group 1, 2 and 3, respectively). Due to a husbandry issue, Group 2, with six
monkeys, was separated into a group of four and a group of two prior to the beginning of data
collection. The two males separated from their group were brothers, and remained within close
proximity and constant visual and vocal contact with their original group. Subjects’ housing
enclosures included both indoor and outdoor areas with enrichment toys and climbing structures
for natural movement and activity. Subjects received primate chow, as well as fruits and
vegetables, daily, and additionally got supplemental enrichment foods most days. All subject
participation in this study was completely voluntary, with no food deprivation, and water
available ad libitum, including during testing.
Subjects expressed their willingness to participate by voluntarily separating into
individual test boxes connected along the outside caging of their home enclosure on the morning
of testing days. Subjects received either one peanut (Groups 1 and 2) or one pecan (Group 3)
upon entering the individual test box. Out of the 21 monkeys housed at the Language Research
Center, only 15 were used in the current study. Three of the monkeys were excluded because
they do not readily separate into the individual test boxes. Another monkey was excluded from
the study due to her impaired visual and motor abilities as a result of old age, and two monkeys
failed to pass the training criterion for the delayed match-to-sample procedure (details below).
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2.2

General Procedure
The current study investigated how different types of experiences (positive or negative)

affect primate working memory, as measured by performance on a cognitive task. In order to
explore this, we first needed to generate experiences that would be interpreted as either positive
or negative by the subjects. In an attempt to keep methodology as similar as possible across
conditions, and thus reduce the possibility of alternative explanations for my results, I used the
same puzzle task for both the positive and negative experiences, adapted to be either rewarding
or frustrating (see below). The apparatus used, shown in Figure 1, was an opaque tube that
attached diagonally to the outside of the subjects’ individual test boxes, hung at an angle that
allowed food rewards placed in the top to roll down it. Three levers or slides, painted blue, were
placed perpendicularly at equal lengths down the tube such that, when closed, they would stop
the progression of rolling food. At the beginning of a trial, all three levers (located next to the
arrows in Figure 1a) were closed. A small piece of colorful cereal (Cap’n Crunch OOPS! All
Berries Cereal) was placed into the top of the tube, stopping when it hit the first lever. Subjects
then had 30 seconds to retrieve the food reward, by lifting all three levers in successive order to
drop the reward down the tube and into the retrieval tray (Figure 1b). If the subject was not
successful within the 30 seconds, the trial timed out and there was a 15-second time out before
the next trial began (this never occurred during testing sessions). If a trial was successful,
subjects experienced a 10-second inter-trial interval (ITI) before the next trial began. Different
manipulations were used to induce positive and negative affect (described below).
Subjects experienced the different conditions’ manipulations immediately prior to 30
minutes on a computerized test of cognitive performance (a delayed match-to-sample task).
While the human literature indicates that the temporal retention of some types of experimentally
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manipulated affect may be less than 30 minutes (Frost & Green, 1982; Gomez, Zimmermann,
Guttormsen Schär, & Danuser, 2009), other research, specifically those relating to anxiety,
indicate that the duration of an anxious mood may last much longer (Kuhlmann, Piel, & Wolf,
2005; Schoofs et al., 2008). The 30-minute testing session was therefore selected to simply
ensure any record of potentially long lasting effects of the experimental manipulation was
caught, as well as maintain consistency with typical testing procedures at the facility. Digital
time stamps for each trial were recorded, which allowed us to go back and look at accuracy for
shorter durations than the full 30-minute session. In particular, we analyzed the session in three
10-minute sections.
Each subject experienced 18 sessions, divided among six positive experience sessions,
six negative experience sessions, and six control sessions (in which there was no manipulation),
and subjects always immediately began the cognitive task after completing the affect
manipulation (except in the control). All six sessions of each condition were presented to the
subjects consecutively, with the order of condition presentation pseudo-randomized so that half
the subjects (n=8) experienced the negative experience first, while the other half (n=7)
experienced the positive experience first. All subjects were presented with the six control
sessions in between the positive and negative sessions. All 18 sessions and the subsequent
computerized testing were video recorded for behavioral analysis.
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Figure 1. Puzzle apparatus used for manipulations. Arrows in (a) indicate the direction the three
levers lifted in order for the food reward to pass down the tube, traveling from the top right in the
picture to the bottom left, where the reward would fall into the retrieval tray (b) and be collected
(see text for detail). (c) depicts how the tray opened in the "trap-door” sessions.

2.3

Positive/Negative Experience Manipulation
2.3.1

Training

Subjects were presented with the puzzle apparatus for training/familiarization sessions
before testing. Each session consisted of 10 trials. Trials began when the tube was baited with the
food reward, and the subjects had one minute to retrieve it. If the subject was unable to complete
the trial within the allotted time, the experimenter lifted each lever herself, allowing the subject
to watch the reward fall into the retrieval tray. Subjects were then allowed access to the reward,
and incurred a 15 second time out before the next trial. Subjects passed the training phase when
they successfully retrieved the reward (without the experimenter’s assistance) on at least eight
out of 10 trials on two consecutive sessions. All subjects successfully passed training within
three sessions.
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2.3.2

Positive Experience

To create an experience that I anticipated being pleasurable for the monkeys, subjects
were presented with the familiar puzzle apparatus. Subjects completed six consecutive trials with
positive reinforcement in the form of a food reward. Consistently receiving a desired food
reward with minimal effort was assumed to be a positive experience. It has also been
demonstrated that object manipulation tasks are mentally enriching to primates (Celli,
Tomonaga, Udono, Teramoto, & Nagano, 2003), so this was predicted to further influence the
positivity of the experience.
2.3.3

Negative Experience

To generate a negative experience, the subjects were presented with the same puzzle task,
but successful completion of the task (and subsequent access to the food reward) was impossible
on some trials. Subjects completed 10 consecutive trials during each negative experience session.
During four of those trials however, the food reward was unobtainable, a presumably frustrating
experience for the subjects. As subjects were unable to acquire the reward in 4/10 trials, the
negative sessions resulted in a total of six actual food rewards, the same as in the positive
condition, to control for satiation. The impossible trials occurred in a pseudo-randomized order
within the 10-trial sessions, with no more than two impossible trials in a row.
There were two different types of impossible trials: jammed-lever trials and trap-door
trials. During jammed-lever trials, the apparatus was experimentally manipulated by turning a
screw (see Figure 1) so that the third and final lever was prevented from lifting high enough to
allow the food reward to pass underneath. Trials lasted 30 seconds, after which the lever was unjammed and the food reward was removed by the experimenter, which was followed by a 10
second ITI before the next trial. In trap-door trials, a latch in the bottom of the retrieval tray was
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unhooked, so that after successful lifting of the third lever, the food reward would fall through
the retrieval tray to the floor, where it was unreachable (Figure 1c). During both types of
negative affect sessions, before every trial the experimenter would manipulate the screw
(jammed-lever) or the retrieval tray latch (trap-door) so that subjects were not cued to when an
impossible trial was set to occur. I cannot be certain the subjects were completely unaware of
which trials were the “bad” ones, however the fact that in every case all subjects attempted to
solve each trial (impossible or not) indicates they likely were naïve to the condition. The two
different types of negative experience (trap-door and jammed-lever) were included to ensure the
generation of a negative experience in case one method may have been more effective than
another, but there were no prior predictions on which would be more successful. Subsequent
analysis revealed no differences between the two types of negative experiences on performance,
so all further analyses grouped the two manipulations into a single negative experience
condition.
2.4

Cognitive Task (Delayed Match-to-Sample)
The current study used a delayed match-to-sample (DMTS) task to assess working

memory in the capuchin monkeys. The DMTS was presented to the subjects using the Language
Research Center’s (LRC) Computerized Test System. The computerized testing occurred in the
subject’s same individual test box as the experience manipulations occurred, immediately
following the manipulation (except in the control condition, in which subjects began
immediately after they separated into the individual box). Each subject had a personal computer
with a 17-inch monitor, a joystick that moves a cursor on the screen, and a pellet dispenser that
distributed small 45-mg banana flavored pellets to the subjects as rewards for a correct response.
Personal computers were stationed approximately 30 cm in front of a Plexiglas window on the
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individual test box, with their personal joystick placed in the box with them. Subjects at the LRC
have had years of experience testing, and are therefore extremely familiar with the computerized
system. They also had extensive prior experience with the DMTS task (Beran et al., 2008; Beran,
Evans, Klein, & Einstein, 2012; Beran & Smith, 2011; Evans, Beran, Chan, Klein, & Menzel,
2008).
Subjects were tested on a DMTS for 30 minutes, during which they could do as many or
as few trials as they chose. At the onset of a trial, an image would appear centered near the top of
the subject’s screen, along with their cursor in the center. Subjects could move their cursor up
towards the image, and upon contact with the border of the image, the picture would disappear.
This would then be followed by a delay of 1, 2, 3 or 5 seconds (randomized order for five trials
of each time delay presented within 20 trial blocks). After the delay, the target image and another
picture would simultaneously appear, randomized between the right and left sides of the screen
(Figure 2). If the subject moved the cursor to the image that matched the original sample, they
would hear a familiar chime indicating a correct response and receive a small banana flavored
pellet. This would be followed by a 2-second ITI before the next trial would begin. If the
subjects moved their cursor over the incorrect image, they would hear a buzzer indicating an
incorrect response and receive no reward and a 5-second timeout before the next trial. Regardless
of accuracy, after every 20 trials there was a 1-minute time out to force brief periods throughout
the task where behavior could be observed that was not specifically directed at the task.
My delay periods (1, 2, 3 and 5 seconds) were chosen based on a previous study with
capuchin monkeys that indicated that 3-second delays affect both subject response time and
accuracy as compared to shorter time delays (Truppa, De Simone, Piano Mortari, & De Lillo,
2014). The 5-second delay was also included to see if there were any effects of the experiences
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on a more challenging task, without increasing the duration so much so that performance sharply
decreased (as is evidenced after 8-second delays; Tavares & Tomaz, 2002). Results indicated
that performance on 1 and 2-second delay trials did not differ from one another, but performance
was impaired by 3-second delays, and further compromised by 5-second delays. There was not
an interaction between delay and condition on their impact on performance, so for all subsequent
analyses data from all delays were combined to provide maximum power to the overall analysis.
a. Original Novel
Stimuli

b. Familiar Stimuli

c. Novel Probe/Testing
Stimuli

Figure 2. Example of the DMTS task screen with sample stimuli. Examples of the original novel stimuli
used (a), familiar stimuli used in training (b), and the novel stimuli used for testing (c).
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Subjects were not originally expected to require training, as all the monkeys had passed a
computer training battery program that included a DMTS before the onset of the study. However,
for some subjects, it had been some time since they had experienced a DMTS, so to verify that
they all still met criterion, subjects were presented with the DMTS using novel stimuli. An
analysis of the data from the subjects’ first three sessions revealed that the subjects were
performing below 80% accuracy (the criterion set for performance), so testing was immediately
stopped and the subjects were placed on training.
2.4.1

Training

Training used the same computerized testing setup described above. The task was the
exact same as described, with the four different time delays in 20 trial blocks, followed by a 1minute timeout. The only difference in the task between training and the original testing attempt
was the stimuli. In the original testing sessions, I introduced novel stimuli that were fairly
complex, and may have been too difficult for the subjects to differentiate (Figure 2a). During
training I used familiar clip-art stimuli that the subjects had seen before during their computer
training (Figure 2b). Subjects also experienced 1-hour training sessions (no more than once
daily) instead of 30-minute testing sessions. Subjects reached training criterion once they
demonstrated 80% or better accuracy during two consecutive sessions. They were then placed on
1-2 Probe sessions, where subjects again experienced a 1-hour session, however the task used
novel stimuli. Instead of the complicated novel stimuli used in the original testing, for Probe
trials I used a bank of 238 images from the Bank of Standardized Stimuli (BOSS), a large
normative photo database (Brodeur, Guérard, & Bouras, 2014). If subjects successfully
maintained 80% or higher accuracy on the first or second Probe session (all subjects did), then
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they passed to the testing phase. Overall, it took the subjects an average of 11 sessions to reach
the training criterion.
2.4.2

Testing

Testing followed the exact same procedure as training, but I used a bank of 450 different
BOSS photos than were used during the Probe sessions.
2.5

Behavioral Analysis
Each session was video-recorded. Behavior was coded for the entire 30 minutes during

which the subjects were on the DMTS task. All anticipated behaviors were compiled into an
ethogram, and any novel behaviors observed during coding were added to the ethogram. No new
behaviors were observed after one session of each subject was coded. The final ethogram
included a total of 22 behaviors (see Appendix A). All behavior was recorded because, while
there are some behaviors known to be associated with stress/anxiety, there are currently no
behaviors in the literature that are behavioral indicators of a positive affective state, and so I was
unable to make predictions about which behaviors would be relevant. Therefore, the purpose of
this component was to identify relevant behavior(s) for use in future work.
Of the 22 behaviors recorded, I eliminated four that were observed in fewer than 10 of
the subjects. One behavior, water drinking, was also eliminated because it was deemed irrelevant
to the manipulation, as thirst is a state behavior unlikely to be affected by experiential changes.
Joystick touching was eliminated because it was presumably correlated with trial number, and
was additionally difficult to reliably code. Likewise, vocalizations could not be reliably coded or
differentiated without specialized recording equipment. Finally, in two cases several behaviors
were combined because there were strong theoretical grounds to do so (this also increased
power). ‘Licking the cage’, ‘picking at the cage’, and ‘wiping the cage’ were all grouped

29

together into ‘cage-directed behaviors’. ‘Pacing’, ‘head-twirling’, and ‘rub hands’ behaviors
were grouped together into a ‘stereotypic behavior’ category, as these are all stereotypical,
functionless and repetitive behaviors often manifest in captive primate populations (Garner,
2005; Garner et al., 2003; Pomerantz et al., 2012). The stereotypic behaviors alone would have
each been eliminated from analysis based on the criterion that at least 10 subjects display the
behavior, but as a category this involved 10 or more individuals. Therefore, for the ultimate
analysis I looked at nine individual behaviors and two behavioral categories.
2.6

Data Analysis
All statistical analyses were run in R version 3.23 (R Core Team, 2015). Model analyses

were conducted using the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015). All model
comparisons were compared using the Akaike information criterion (AIC) to determine the bestfit models. P-values were determined via likelihood ratio tests comparing the full model with the
fixed effects against a null model with just the random effects. Behaviors were measured as
counts of every occurrence of the behavior (or behavioral category) of interest within a session.
Sessions were divided up by time into three sections; 0-10 minutes, 10-20 minutes and 20-30
minutes to examine any possible effects of time within a session. Accuracy was measured as the
proportion of correct responses to the total number of trials completed. Visual inspection of
residual plots did not reveal any obvious deviations from homoscedasticity or normality.
First, to initially determine if condition influenced overall levels of participation in the
DMTS task, I ran a Generalized Linear Mixed Model (GLMM) with trial number as the
dependent variable (DV). I included condition (control, positive and negative) and time as fixed
effects, and Subject ID as a random effect. I compared the full model to the null model (which
included only the random effect) using a likelihood ratio test.
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Second, to assess whether behaviors differed across the conditions, I ran a series of
GLMMs with Poisson distributions for each behavior. I constructed separate models with counts
of each behavior (or behavioral category) as the DVs, condition as a fixed effect, and Subject ID
entered as a random effect. Analysis excluded 3 cases with missing data.
Third, I examined the effects of both condition and behavior on accuracy. To assess
whether condition and time influenced accuracy, I constructed a model comparison analysis
comparing 4 Linear Mixed Models (LMM) with accuracy as the DV; two models with each
condition or time as fixed effects alone, a combined model with both factors, and a model with
an interaction effect. All controlled for Subject ID as a random effect.
To determine whether the behaviors influenced by condition were also influencing
DMTS task performance, I ran a series of LMMs with accuracy as the DV, each behavior as a
fixed effect, and Subject ID as a random effect. The behaviors that significantly predicted
accuracy were then further analyzed with another series of LMMs, comparing three models for
each behavior’s effects on accuracy (DV); a model that included just the behavior, one with both
the behavior and condition as fixed effects, and one model with an interaction effect (all with
Subject ID as a random effect).
Finally, to determine the overall best model for predicting cognitive performance, a
model comparison was conducted comparing models including each of the fixed effects
(condition, time and the behaviors that significantly influenced performance) with and without
each other, as well as models with any significant interactions.
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3
3.1

RESULTS

Behavior
The best-fit model for predicting trial number included both condition and time as fixed

effects. Model comparisons revealed that a model including both factors better-explained trial
number than models with either factor alone or a null model, but there was no interaction effect
between condition and time (Table 1). On average, subjects performed 32.8 (± 0.70) trials in the
positive condition, significantly less than the number of trials performed in the negative
condition (34.1 ± 0.73 trials; b = -0.05, z = -3.38, p = .002) or in the control (34.5 ± 0.69 trials; β
= -0.07, z = -4.72, p < .001; Figure 3). Regardless of condition, subjects completed the most
trials during the first 10 minutes of sessions (36.9 ± 0.54), significantly fewer during the middle
third of the session (34.2 ± 0.72 trials; β = -0.08, z = -5.33, p < .001), and the fewest number of
trials during the last 10 minutes (31.3 ± 0.80 trials; β = -0.09, z = -5.98, p < .001).

Table 1. Comparison of the models used to predict Trial Number
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Figure 3. The effects of Condition and Time on the number of trials subjects completed. Error bars
reflect 1 ± SE.

I found that of the 11 behaviors analyzed, 7 significantly differed between conditions (see
Figure 4; Scratching; χ2(2)= 12.63, p = .002, Self-licking; χ2(2)= 15.17, p < .001, Threatening;
χ2(2)= 18.98, p < .001, Self-touching; χ2(2)= 12.90, p = .002, Playing with pellet; χ2(2)= 23.83, p
< .001, Cage-directed behavior; χ2(2)= 82.62, p < .001, Stereotypic behavior; χ2(2)= 161.95, p <
.001).
Specifically, I found that compared to the control condition, in both the positive and
negative conditions there was significantly more stereotypic behavior (Figure 4a; negative: β =
0.26, z = 8.66, p < .001; positive: β = 0.36, z = 12.37, p < .001), and self-touching (Figure 4e.;
negative: β = 0.26, z = 3.50, p = .001; positive: β = 0.18, z = 2.49, p = .034), and significantly
less cage-directed behaviors (Figure 4c.; negative: β = -0.19, z = -6.51, p < .001; positive: β = 0.26, z = -8.65, p < .001) and playing with the pellet (Figure 4d.; negative: β = -0.14, z = -3.32, p
< .001; positive: β = -0.20, z = -4.73, p < .001).
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Compared to the negative condition, in both the positive and control conditions there was
significantly less scratching (Figure 4b.; positive: β = -0.08, z = -3.04, p = .007; control: β = 0.09, z = -3.10, p = .005) and threatening behavior (Figure 4f.; positive: β = -0.51, z = -2.55, p =
.028; control: β = -0.97, z = -4.14, p < .001). There was also more stereotypic behavior in the
positive condition than the negative (Figure 4a.; β = 0.10, z = 3.69, p < .001), and less in the
control (β = -0.26, z = -8.66, p < .001)
The only behavior significantly different in just the positive condition was self-licking
behavior (Figure 4g.), of which there was significantly more in the positive condition than either
the negative condition (β = 0.17, z = 3.28, p = .003) or the control (β = 0.18, z = 3.42, p = .002).

34

Figure 4. Results for the average occurrences of stereotypic behavior (a), scratching (b), cage-directed
behavior (c), playing with the pellet (d), self-touching (e), threatening (f) and self-licking (g) between
conditions. Error bars reflect ± 1 SE. ‘*’ p < .05, ‘**’ p < .01, ‘***’ p <.001. Note: Graphs depict mean
aggregated summary results and do not control for subject differences, while the p values come from
GLMM’s that control for Subject ID as a random effect. Note: Y-axis change between graphs a-d (ymax
= 50) and e-g (ymax = 10).
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3.2

Cognitive Performance
Overall, subjects performed quite well on the DMTS task, with a composite average of

83.4% (± 0.40) correct. This was as expected, since the criterion to participate in the study was
80% or greater accuracy. There was a significant effect of condition on DMTS task performance
(χ2(2)= 12.43, p = .002), with higher performance in the positive condition (84.1 ± 0.64%, β =
0.02, t = 2.96, p = .003) and control (84.5 ± 0.67%, β = 0.03, t = 3.09, p = .004) compared to the
negative condition (81.5 ± 0.75%). There was no significant difference in performance between
the positive condition and the control, and there was no significant effect of time on accuracy or
an interaction between time and condition (Figure 5).

Figure 5. The effects of Condition and Time on subject Accuracy (as measured by the proportion of
correct trials to the total number of trials completed). Error bars reflect ± 1 SE.

Of the seven behaviors significantly affected by the experimental manipulation, three also
significantly affected performance on the DMTS task. Higher rates of playing with the pellet (β
= .001, t = 3.66, p = .003, see Figure 6b) and self-licking behavior (β = 0.002, t = 3.84, p < .001,
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see Figure 6c) related to higher levels of accuracy on the task. Contrasting this, increased rates of
scratching correlated with decreased performance on the DMTS task (β = -0.001, t = -2.60, p =
.010, see Figure 6a). Increased rates of stereotypic behavior also related to decreased
performance, however the effect was not statistically significant (p = .055).

Figure 6. The effects of scratching (a), playing with pellets (b) and self-licking (c) on Accuracy (as
measured by the proportion of correct trials to the total number of trials completed)

Since both behavior and condition significantly affected cognitive performance, model
comparisons were run to determine whether condition and the behavior were independently
impacting performance, or whether there was an interaction. While each model predicting
accuracy with behavior alone as a factor was significantly better than a null model, and every
model was improved by the addition of condition as a fixed effect, none of the models showed a
significant interaction (Table 2).
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Table 2. Comparison of the models predicting Accuracy on the DMTS task

The overall best-fit model for predicting accuracy on the DMTS task included scratching,
self-licking, playing with the pellet, and condition as fixed effects, with Subject ID as a random
effect. Adding time to the model did not improve the fit. In this final model, performance was
significantly higher in both the positive and the control conditions compared to the negative
condition, increased rates of playing with the pellet and self-licking behavior related to better
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performance, and increased scratching was related to a decrease in performance. Estimates (β)
and p-values for all of the fixed effects in the final model can be found in Table 3. Overall, the
final model reveals that while condition alone significantly predicts accuracy better than the null
model, adding behaviors into the model as predictive factors provides a significantly better
model for predicting accuracy than condition alone. Therefore, behavior can help explain
variance in accuracy beyond what just the conditions explain.

Table 3. Fixed effects values for the full model predicting Accuracy on the DMTS (including scratching,
self-licking, play with pellet behavior, and condition with subject ID and session as random effects)
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4

DISCUSSION

Experiences immediately prior to cognitive testing affected both the subsequent
performance on the cognitive test and the behavior of the capuchin monkeys. In line with
predictions, a negative, frustrating experience impaired working memory performance compared
to a previous positive experience or a control. This is consistent with previous studies in humans
and primates that find impairments to working memory after stress (Arnsten & Goldman-Rakic,
1998; Oei et al., 2006; Schoofs et al., 2008). Increases in dopamine release as the result of the
experience of positive affect is theorized to enhance working memory (Ashby et al., 1999),
however contrary to my predictions, a positive experience prior to the working memory test did
not have an augmenting effect on task performance.
While it is possible that positive affect may not have a facilitative effect on primate
working memory in the task, it is also possible that the manipulation did not generate a sufficient
increase in positive affect. For example, despite the fact that all subjects were ultimately
successful with the task, some subjects never learned the most effective way to lift the lever
(lifting straight up allowed for a very smooth and easy movement), and instead fought with the
lever, trying to pull it towards them. This made the task somewhat more difficult. Additionally,
and perhaps more importantly, several of the subjects responded quite aggressively to the
removal of the apparatus. Anecdotally, these subjects would vocalize and threaten the
experimenter as the tube was being unclipped from their cage, and they would often grab on to
the apparatus and tightly hold it to prevent removal, to the point of nearly (and occasionally
actually) breaking it. This may have mitigated any possible positive effects of the apparatus.
Finally, my control may not have been appropriate. In the control, subjects were placed on a
relatively easy task (the DMTS) after receiving a food reward for a behavior and protocol they
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are extremely familiar with (entering their individual testing box). I therefore may be seeing
some level of positive affect in the animals even during the control. Thus, the lack of a
facilitative effect of positive affect on working memory above and beyond the control should be
interpreted cautiously, and future work should focus on developing procedures that ensure the
generation of positive affect.
In line with my predictions, after the negative experience, subjects displayed increased
rates of scratching and threatening behavior compared to both the positive condition and the
control, as well as increased levels of stereotypic behavior, although this was only significantly
greater than the control. Increases in these types of behaviors are strongly indicative of negative
affective states (Lutz, 2014; Maestripieri et al., 1992; Troisi, 2002), signifying the effectiveness
of the study’s negative manipulation in inducing a negative affect in the subjects.
As there were no a priori predictions for what behaviors might increase when
experiencing positive affect, I recorded all behaviors to see what I could find. The only behavior
that occurred at significantly different rates in the positive condition than both the negative
condition and control was self-licking behavior, which occurred at the highest rate after the
positive experience. I do not have any explanations for why this may have been the case. While
this behavior may be something important to look into in future research, the fact that I could not
independently verify that I induced positive affect suggests caution. In fact, for all of the other
behaviors for which I see a significant difference between the positive condition and the control,
the difference for the positive condition is in the same direction as that of changes in behavior in
the negative condition. Since I can more confidently conclude that the negative experience did
result in negative affect, these findings imply that the positive condition created an affective state
more akin to the negative condition than the control.
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This conclusion is not, however, consistent with the results of scratching behavior,
arguably the most reliable indicator of negative affect, or threatening behavior, both of which
were significantly higher in the negative condition than either the positive or the control
condition (which did not significantly differ from one another). Thus, an alternate possibility for
the pattern of similar increases and decreases in some behaviors between the positive and
negative conditions compared to the control is that some of these behaviors are more linked to
arousal than affective valence. Both the positive and negative experiences involved interactions
with a manipulated puzzle task, while the control did not. This may have caused arousal levels in
both of these conditions that surpassed that of the control, and resulted in increased self-touching
and stereotypic behavior and reduced cage-directed behaviors and playing with the pellet. This is
further supported by the fact that cognitive performance was only affected by the negative
condition (and not the control or positive) indicating this impact may be the result of negative
affect and not an increase in arousal generally.
Finally, in the control, the subjects received no additional food prior to testing, as in the
other conditions. Therefore, another possible explanation for this pattern of behavior is that
subjects were less satiated in the control, changing their behavior. On the other hand, there is no
reason to predict that satiation would have directly affected any of the observed behaviors. In
fact, the one behavior that there is theoretical grounds to expect would differ based on satiation
levels was trial number, because less satiated subjects may be more motivated to get food
rewards and therefore do more trials, but there was not a significant difference in the number of
trials done in the control versus the negative condition.
Ultimately I was unable to find a behavior reliably indicative of positive affect, in part
because the experimental manipulation did not appear to effectively generate positive affect.
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Although some of these behaviors (i.e., cage-directed behavior, self-licking and playing with
food) may be related, this can only be demonstrated with further testing. I was, nevertheless, able
to further validate the use of scratching behavior as an indicator of negative affect. The
correlation between scratching and the negative condition compared to both of the other
conditions, in conjunction with the significant finding that beyond condition, scratching itself can
be predictive of decreased working memory performance, indicates that scratching may be the
most reliable behavioral indicator of negative affect.
It is important to note that my final, best-fit, model for predicting accuracy on the task
included both condition and behavior as predictive factors. In other words, including the
behaviors as factors significantly improved predictions of accuracy beyond what condition alone
predicted. The most likely explanation for this is that despite my best attempts, the subjects’
affect was not entirely within my control. The subjects of the study live in complex social
groups, and were subject to outside influences both before and during testing. It is possible that
what behavior was measuring was the additional influence from non-testing factors on affect.
This is a hypothesis that deserves further testing, but in the meantime, it is important to
remember such outside influences when designing studies on affect.
One final comment regards the relation of these studies to previous neuroscience work.
Although I did not measure brain activation, our knowledge of which areas are activated for
these tasks allows us to speculate. Unfortunately, these data do nothing to break the impasse
between the two competing hypotheses of whether activation prepares organisms for subsequent
responding and improves performance, or depletes necessary resources and impairs it. Research
on prefrontal cortex (PFC) activation during different types of working memory tasks shows a
lateralization of brain activation, with object working memory tasks (as used in the current
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study) demonstrating relatively high left PFC activation (Courtney et al., 1998; Smith et al.,
1995). Similarly, as discussed in the Introduction, neurological studies have clearly demonstrated
asymmetric effects of positive and negative emotions on brain activation, with negative affect
activating the right hemisphere and positive affect activating the left (Ahern & Schwartz, 1985;
Davidson et al., 1990).
Interestingly, following the assumptions of this research, the current study found a
damaging effect of negative affect (right hemisphere activating) on a task relying predominately
on the left PFC. These results are clearly in contrast to the resource depletion hypothesis, which
predicts that we would only see deficits in tasks reliant upon the activated area (right PFC). Due
to the fact that I was unable to verify the experience of positive affect, further interpretation of
the results is challenging. Indeed, it is not clear whether there was no positive affect, or whether
both the positive experience and the control generated positive affect in the subjects, in which
case the finding of an increase in performance in the positive and control conditions compared to
the negative condition may be interpreted as supporting the facilitating activation hypothesis.
There is also another possible explanation for the current results. As I did not take any
measures of brain activation in the current study, and am only assuming left PFC dominance in
the DMTS task because research has shown that object working memory is left lateralized. These
studies, however, utilized non-meaningful shapes as visual stimuli, while the current study used
distinct pictures. Some research has shown that working memory for images under short delays
may actually be right lateralized in the PFC (Courtney, Ungerleider, Keil, & Haxby, 1996).
Courtney and colleagues (1998) argue that working memory involving short-term, icon-like
maintenance of an image relies more on the right prefrontal cortex, while learning rules for nonmeaningful shape memory may be more akin to verbal working memory, previously
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demonstrated to be left lateralized (d’Esposito et al., 1998; Davidson et al., 1990), and thus
explains the results of the other studies. This has since received additional empirical support
(Wager & Smith, 2003), and would then imply that the current task relied predominately on right
PFC activation, and results are consistent with the resource depletion hypothesis. This would
also be congruent with my finding that negative experiences seemingly reduced working
memory performance from the positive experience and a control baseline. Future research on
how frustration such as experienced in this experiment may differentially, or not, impact object
and spatial working memory is needed.
In summary, the current study found a significant decrease in cognitive performance on a
working memory task following a mild, negative experience. Previous studies have demonstrated
deleterious effects of acute and chronic stress on working memory (Cazakoff et al., 2010; Mika
et al., 2012), and some have even shown impairments after “mild” stress (Arnsten & GoldmanRakic, 1998), although I would argue that their stressor, a continuous loud noise for 30 minute
prior to testing, is slightly more than mildly stressful. To my knowledge, however, this is the first
study to look at the cognitive effects of a mild, negative experience that induces negative affect
through a relatively natural behavior of the species. These results further inform the literature on
the effects of mild stressors on cognition, as well as have implications for animal welfare and
animal research (i.e. the order of the presentation of tasks/tests of varying difficulty levels, and
therefore possibly frustrating, may affect subsequent performance).
To improve future studies, researchers are badly in need of alternative measures of affect.
One possibility is judgment bias tasks used in conjunction with the experimental manipulations
of the current study, which may help to indicate whether positive affect was actually generated
above and beyond the control, and I simply did not see working memory effects, or whether

45

modifications of the experience are needed (as is suspected) to actually generate positive affect.
Further, multiple measures of affect would help improve the confidence of behavioral indicators
of positive affect, once correlations between behaviors and positive affect are found.
Additionally, in future work it will be important to control for non-test related activities that
generate affect on their own (i.e., the frustration engendered by removing the apparatus or the
positive affect engendered by the reward upon coming into the test area). This would help to
better pinpoint which actions are changing affect, and thereby better predict the subject’s affect.
Future work should also look at the effects of positive and negative affect on a variety of
cognitive tasks as well as the effects of positive and negative experiences on subsequent social
behavior.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A. Behavioral ethogram for all recorded behaviors
Behavior
Joystick Toucha,b
Water Drink
Scratch

Shake
Auto-groom
Self-touch
Pacea,b
Manipulate object
Head twirla,b
Urine wash
Lick caging
Bounce
Threaten
Wipe caging
Pick at caging
Lip-smack
Push on faceplate

Play with pellet

Description
Subject meaningfully touches the joystick with a hand or foot
(does not count if subject leans against joystick or accidental
touches it)
Subject consumes water from their water spout or bottle
Rapid, repeated touching of the body with either a foot or hand. If
a different part of the body is scratched it’s counted as a new
occurrence, or if the same body part is scratched but with a
different limb
Subjects full body vibrates, typically starts in the tail and runs up
the body
Subject touches, picks at or combs through their fur with one or
both hands. Characterized by a pinching behavior, often
accompanied with pushing their fur around and biting the area
Brief contact from the subjects hand or foot to another part of
their body that is not better categorized by scratch or auto-groom
Subject travels back and forth the full length of their test box. The
same pace/tempo must be maintained in both directions, with no
pause or hesitation at either end
Subject holds or moves an object around, such as a tray or
carabineer attached to the cage or a food item remaining
Subject’s head rapidly jerks back and arcs around. All
occurrences of behavior counted, does not require 3-second
interval, and an exception to the rule for interrupting a behavior
Subject’s hand is urinated on while being held between their legs,
followed by a rubbing/scratching behavior elsewhere on the body
Subject licks or pushes teeth or mouth against caging or faceplate
Subject crouches over onto all fours and jumps with all four limbs
off of the caging
Subject bares teeth and assumes a rigid posture; or slams both
hands into front/back of box quickly and aggressively
Subject uses entire hand and palm and rubs it across a section of
the caging or faceplate
Subject pokes, scratches or touches the caging or faceplate with a
finger or fingers
Subject rapidly chatters their teeth or touches their lips together,
often accompanied by grunts or squeaks and a headshake
Subject uses both hands to move the front or back faceplate.
Hands are either both flat against the faceplate, or one is pushing
against the faceplate with the other in the pellet dispenser hole to
move the faceplate right or left
Subject removes pellet from their mouth. This behavior may
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Lick self
Rub hands
Reach
Play with water

include simply spitting out the pellet and then eating it again,
removing the pellet and tapping it against some part of the cage
or themselves, or rubbing it back and forth between their hands
Subject uses their tongue to contact or pushes their mouth against
another part of their body
Subject places palms together and rapidly moves hands back and
forth
Subject extends hand or arm out past caging (must have limb
extended to wrist or further)
Subject touches or hits the water source, causing water to run but
does not drink

Note: Every occurrence of behavior was recorded. Behavior was counted as a new occurrence instead of a
continuation of the last if there was a 3-second period between the end of the first occurrence and the start
of the second. If another behavior occurred between two occurrences of a different behavior (regardless of
time) the interrupted behavior is counted again.
a
Every occurrence of this behavior is counted regardless of the amount of time between occurrences
b
Occurrences of this behavior do not interrupt the 3-second count on another behavior being a new
occurrence or not

